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FEMININITY AND THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: 
AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO 
TEXAS’S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE 
Jessica Salvucci* 
Abstract: Capital punishment in the United States appears to apply to 
only one class of citizens—men. Despite their significant proportional 
commission of homicides, women account for less than one percent of 
executions in America. This Note evaluates this trend in the context of a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to capital punish-
ment in Texas, America’s staunchest death penalty supporter. It discusses 
issues of paternalism and gender theory as they relate to the Texas capital 
punishment statute and its application throughout the legal and political 
process. Finally, this Note argues that despite a series of constitutional ob-
stacles, the Supreme Court should strike down the Texas death penalty 
statute based on its invidious gender discrimination. 
Introduction 
 In 1974, Doyle Skillern waited in a nearby car as a friend shot and 
killed an undercover narcotics agent.1 Eleven years later, he was exe-
cuted by the state of Texas for the agent’s murder.2 In 1980, Pamela 
Lynn Perillo robbed a man and strangled him to death after he picked 
her up as a hitchhiker.3 Her death sentence was overturned; she is cur-
rently serving life in a Texas prison but could be eligible for parole in 
2014.4 At first glance, it seems strange that Skillern was put to death for 
his peripheral involvement in a homicide, whereas Perillo, who killed a 
man with her own two hands, escaped with her life and may walk free 
                                                                                                                      
* Comment Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 Texan Executed for Killing, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at 2. 
2 Id. 
3 Bill Murphy, Court’s Ruling Favors Woman on Death Row, Houston Chron., Mar. 3, 
2000, at A33. 
4 Fate of Texas Women’s Death Row Inmate May Be in Governor’s Hands, KWTX (Nov. 30, 
2004), http://www.kwtx.com/news/headlines/1111972.html. 
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in a few years.5 It would, however, be more unusual if Perillo had been 
executed.6 
 There are more women awaiting execution in the United States 
than in any other country in the world.7 Although this statistic may 
seem to indicate that American women are sentenced to death at an 
alarming rate, women actually account for less than one percent of 
people executed in the United States.8 Since the reinstitution of the 
death penalty in 1976, only twelve women have been executed.9 Three 
of these women were executed in Texas.10 Texas tends to have the repu-
tation as the most “bloodthirsty” death penalty state and has executed 
more people than any other state in the nation.11 But even Texas fails 
to apply capital punishment equally to its male and female offenders.12 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id.; Texan Executed for Killing, supra note 1. 
6 See, e.g., Women and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/women-and-death-penalty (last visited May 8, 2011) (showing that 
only twelve women have been executed since 1976). 
7 Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 
Wis. Women’s L.J. 283, 314 (1996). 
8 See id.; Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 609, 609 (2006). 
9 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. Since 1976, 1235 men have been exe-
cuted. Searchable Execution Database, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www.deathpen- 
altyinfo.org/executions (select “m” under “Gender of Person Executed”; then follow 
“Search by Details” hyperlink) (last visited May 8, 2011); Women and the Death Penalty, supra 
note 6. The year 1976 is often used as the marker for “modern” capital punishment be-
cause of the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, which effectively placed a 
moratorium on capital punishment until 1976. See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972); Streib, 
supra note 8, at 621−22. Furman effectively invalidated all death penalty statutes and forced 
states to reevaluate their capital punishment statutes for constitutionality. See Streib, supra 
note 8, at 621−22. The Court eventually approved certain state death penalty statutes in 
Gregg v. Georgia, thus lifting the moratorium. See 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); Streib, supra 
note 8, at 621−22. 
10 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 (showing that Texas is tied with Okla-
homa for the highest number of women executed). 
11 See Kathleen A. O’Shea, Women and the Death Penalty in the United States, 
1900−1998, at 329 (1999) (calling Texas the “Death Penalty Capital of the Western World”); 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Texas High Court Judge Defends Execution Order: We’re Not ‘Bloodthirsty,’ 
A.B.A. J. ( June 19, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/texas_high_court_ 
judge_defends_execution_order_were_not_bloodthirsty (quoting Judge Cheryl Johnson’s 
statement that Texas courts are “always accused of being callous and bloodthirsty”); Women 
and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 (showing that Texas and Oklahoma have each executed 
three women since 1976, more than any other state). 
12 See Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp of 
the 21st Century, 26 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 581, 585 (2000). 
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Since the reinstatement of the death penalty, Texas has executed 464 
men and only three women.13 
 The gender disparity in Texas’s executions is not due to a mere 
disparity in the commission of homicides, but is rather due to far more 
complicated factors.14 Although women commit nearly ten percent of 
death-eligible crimes, they almost never receive the state’s ultimate pun-
ishment.15 America’s paternalistic view of women has shaped Texas’s 
views on moral culpability and produced a capital punishment statute 
that punishes “masculine” rather than “feminine” crimes.16 If women do 
become eligible for death sentences, this paternalism continues to pro-
vide protection to female defendants as they are charged, tried, sen-
tenced, and reviewed for clemency.17 Women lose this protection only if 
they stray from feminine norms or breach their duties as wives, mothers, 
and caretakers.18 
 This Note will demonstrate that Texas applies its death penalty stat-
ute in a way that discriminates against men and violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I of this Note will 
give a brief overview of the history of the death penalty and the Ameri-
can government’s paternalistic treatment of women. It will also explore 
two predominant theories regarding gender and the death penalty and 
explain why so few women are given death sentences. Part II will evalu-
ate Texas’s death penalty statute by explaining the gender bias inherent 
in its aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. Part III will ex-
                                                                                                                      
13 See State by State Database, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/state_by_state (last visited May 8, 2011); Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
14 See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 12, at 585; Streib, supra note 8, at 609 (stating that 
women receive favorable treatment within the capital punishment system); Women and the 
Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
15 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 (showing that women account for ten 
percent of murder arrests but less than one percent of executions). 
16 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); Janice L. Kopec, Stu-
dent Article, Avoiding a Death Sentence in the American Legal System: Get a Woman to Do It, 15 
Cap. Def. J. 353, 355 (2003) (explaining that men tend to commit willful killings during 
the commission of robbery, rape, or abduction, whereas women tend to kill family mem-
bers and loved ones in the heat of passion). 
17 See Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penalty, 8 Am. 
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 427, 453 (2000) (noting that according to a 1989 study, fe-
males received more lenient sentences, even compared with males who committed equiva-
lent crimes); S. Carolina Confronts Death Penalty for Women, Augusta Chron., June 26, 2006, 
at B8 (explaining that prosecutors often shy away from charging women with capital 
crimes). See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection, 
and the Politics of Gender in Women’s Capital Cases, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 967 (2001) (explain-
ing that women receive favorable treatment during clemency proceedings). 
18 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 459; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
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plore gender discrimination throughout the processes of charging, try-
ing, and sentencing a capital crime. It will also discuss gender bias 
within considerations of clemency. Part IV will profile the three women 
that Texas has executed since 1976 and attempt to explain why they 
have been singled out as the only women deserving of execution in 
modern Texan history. Part V will argue that the Texas capital punish-
ment statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and discuss and refute oppositions to this argument. 
I. History and Gender Theory 
A. History 
 Since the colonial period in America, more than 20,000 people 
have been executed by the federal and state governments.19 Only about 
400 of these people, however, have been women.20 The first legal execu-
tion in the United States took place in 1608, but the first execution of a 
woman did not take place until 1632.21 Even during a time when execu-
tions were commonplace entertainment, the public still found some-
thing abhorrent about executing women.22 In the 1700s, for example, it 
was standard practice in England to hang and burn immoral crimi-
nals.23 When Margaret Sullivan suffered this fate, however, a local news-
paper noted, “There is something inhuman in burning a woman.”24 
                                                                                                                     
 For many years, it was considered acceptable and even natural to 
treat women more leniently when sentencing them for their crimes.25 
For example, men were historically given death sentences for a variety 
of offenses, including petty theft, while women were primarily executed 
only for more serious crimes such as homicide or witchcraft.26 Society 
 
 
19 Thad Rueter, Why Women Aren’t Executed: Gender Bias and the Death Penalty, 23 Hum. 
Rts. 10, 10 (1996). 
20 See id. 
21 See Harry Greenlee & Shelia P. Greenlee, Women and the Death Penalty: Racial Dispari-
ties and Differences, 14 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 319, 320 (2008). The first woman exe-
cuted in the United States was Jane Champion of Virginia; her crime is unknown. O’Shea, 
supra note 11, at 4. 
22 See O’Shea, supra note 11, at 2−3. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 3. This sympathy did not extend to women of color, especially African 
American women, who were executed frequently. See Kopec, supra note 16, at 353−54 
(showing that forty-seven percent of women executed throughout American history were 
black). 
25 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 353. 
26 See Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Of-
fenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 
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saw women as feeble creatures that needed to be protected and gener-
ally spared them from state-imposed death in the same way women 
were excused from military service.27 As one Oregon governor stated 
after granting clemency to a condemned woman, “‘When I saw that 
woman in the penitentiary (the only one there), it made me sick, and 
so I turned her loose.’”28 
 Women who violated their sacred roles as wives and mothers by 
killing their husbands or children were the exception to the societal 
unwillingness to execute women.29 Under English common law, 
women who killed their husbands could be tried not only for murder 
but also for treason.30 Traditionally, women are also punished more 
harshly than men for the murder of their own offspring.31 In colonial 
America, for example, any non-slave woman who killed her illegitimate 
child for the purposes of concealment would automatically receive a 
death sentence.32 
                                                                                                                     
 Today, women and men do not receive facially different treatment 
when being tried, convicted, and sentenced for capital crimes.33 Never-
theless, many of the historical viewpoints and themes discussed above 
continue to be an implicit part of the death penalty.34 Many capital 
punishment statutes, including the one in Texas, have a disparate effect 
favoring female offenders.35 Women also tend to receive more lenient 
treatment from prosecutors, juries, judges, and politicians.36 Regard-
 
 
Tex. L. Rev. 1413, 1430 (1997) (noting that most women executed throughout American 
history were convicted of homicide, though seven percent were executed for witchcraft); 
Kopec, supra note 16, at 353−54. 
27 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 354−55. Some countries, including many former Soviet 
Bloc nations, completely exempt women from capital punishment or provide mitigation 
for pregnancy or motherhood. Streib, supra note 8, at 616. 
28 See Rapaport, supra note 12, at 588 (quoting Governor West’s 1908 statement). 
29 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 304. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See Rapaport, supra note 12, at 589; e.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2010). 
34 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 304 (detailing the harsh punishments historically given 
to women who killed their husbands or children); Kopec, supra note 16, at 358−63 (show-
ing that women continue to be most harshly punished for acting contrary to their roles as 
wives and mothers). 
35 See § 19.03; Kopec, supra note 16, at 355; State by State Database, supra note 13; Women 
and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
36 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 (noting that many judges have admitted to 
treating women with more leniency than men); Streib, supra note 8, at 628 (explaining 
that politicians are hesitant to advocate for gender equality in the death penalty setting); 
Kopec, supra note 16, at 356−57 (stating that judges and juries are more likely to view 
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less, the protections afforded by womanhood can be lost if a woman 
violates her gender-specific role as a wife, mother, and caretaker.37 The 
two sides of this dichotomy have become known as the “chivalry the-
ory” and the “evil woman theory.”38 
B. The Chivalry Theory 
 As discussed above, the criminal justice system has long treated 
women leniently.39 This is due in part to the paternalistic view that 
women are weak and passive and thus need male protection.40 A classic 
example of paternalism is seen in the case of Ethel Spinelli, a California 
woman who sat on death row in the 1940s.41 Before Spinelli’s pending 
execution, thirty male inmates petitioned the governor to commute 
her sentence and offered to draw straws and be sent to the gas chamber 
in her place.42 The inmates argued, 
Mrs. Spinelli’s execution would be repulsive to the people of 
California; that no woman in her right mind could commit 
the crime charged to her; that the execution of a woman 
would hurt California in the eyes of the world; that both the 
law and the will of the people were against the execution; that 
Mrs. Spinelli, as the mother of three children, should have 
special consideration; that California’s proud record of never 
having executed a woman should not be spoiled.43 
 Women receive more sympathy than men, and their crimes are of-
ten excused “as aberrations, caused by a mental defect or some weak-
                                                                                                                      
women as sympathetic and capable of rehabilitation); S. Carolina Confronts Death Penalty for 
Women, supra note 17 (explaining that prosecutors often shy away from charging women 
with capital crimes). 
37 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 26, at 1422; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
38 Elizabeth Marie Reza, Note, Gender Bias in North Carolina’s Death Penalty, 12 Duke J. 
Gender L. & Pol’y 179, 182−83 (2005). 
39 See supra Part I.A. 
40 See Alan Rogers, “Success—At Long Last”: The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Massachu-
setts, 1928−1984, 22 B.C. Third World L.J. 281, 346 (2002) (showing that the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts supported the death penalty in part because of “women’s ‘desper-
ate need’ for protection” (quoting Commonwealth’s Supplemental Brief at 6, 8, 10, 35, 
Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E. 2d 676 (Mass. 1975) (on file at the Massachusetts SJC 
Archives))); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456. 
41 See Reza, supra note 38, at 183. Spinelli was convicted for ordering the murder of a 
fellow gang member. O’Shea, supra note 11, at 69. 
42 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 457. 
43 Id. The governor rejected the inmates’ petition and Spinelli was executed in Cali-
fornia’s gas chamber on November 21, 1941. O’Shea, supra note 11, at 68−69. 
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ness of character or by circumstances beyond their control.”44 Under 
the chivalry theory, women are helpless and, like children, the mentally 
retarded, and the insane, they should not be punished with death.45 
C. The Evil Woman Theory 
 Although paternalism affords women a certain amount of protec-
tion, a woman can lose this protection if she strays from expected femi-
nine norms.46 When a woman’s crime violates her role as a wife, 
mother, or caretaker, a jury may treat her even more harshly than it 
would a man.47 Often, being a bad wife or mother is what actually con-
demns a woman.48 For example, although domestic homicides typically 
are considered less serious than other killings, more than half of the 
women on death row in 2005 were there for killing family members 
and lovers.49 In fact, eight of the twelve women executed in the mod-
ern era were convicted of killing their husbands, lovers, or children.50 
                                                                                                                     
 These two theories of crime and gender create underlying themes 
in capital punishment law and practice in Texas.51 Paternalistic roots 
 
44 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 469. 
45 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 11; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–75 
(2005) (holding that the execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age at 
the time they committed a capital crime was unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of individuals with mental retardation was 
unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding that the execu-
tion of a person who is insane was unconstitutional). 
46 See Carroll, supra note 26, at 1422; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
47 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 310. 
48 See Carroll, supra note 26, at 1422; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
49 See Streib, supra note 8, at 615, 626. Within the category of “family murder,” another 
category has emerged for women who kill family members for economic gain, a motivation 
that allows prosecutors to paint them as “black widows.” See Mary Welek Atwell, 
Wretched Sisters: Examining Gender and Capital Punishment 110 (2007) (detailing 
the trial of Betty Lou Beets, in which the defendant was portrayed as a black widow serial 
killer who preyed upon her husbands for their money); Rapaport, supra note 12, at 583; 
Schmall, supra note 7, at 302. 
50 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. This includes Velma Barfield (convicted 
of poisoning her boyfriend to cover up incidences of theft); Judy Buenoano (convicted of 
murdering her husband for insurance purposes); Betty Lou Beets (convicted of murdering 
her husband for insurance purposes); Christina Riggs (convicted of smothering her two 
young children); Wanda Jean Allen (convicted of murdering her lesbian lover); Marilyn 
Plantz (convicted of hiring her boyfriend to kill her husband); Frances Newton (convicted 
of murdering her husband and children); and Teresa Lewis (convicted of murdering her 
husband and stepson for insurance purposes). See generally Atwell, supra note 49 (discuss-
ing the twelve women executed in the modern era and their crimes); Women and the Death 
Penalty, supra note 6. 
51 See Reza, supra note 38, at 182−86 (explaining the chivalry and evil woman theories 
and discussing gender bias in modern capital statutes). 
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have shaped the Texas death penalty statute, characterizing crimes 
committed more often by men as the most deserving of harsh punish-
ment and permitting juries to find feminine qualities as the most de-
serving of mercy—a bias that continues throughout the capital pun-
ishment process.52 
II. Statutory Bias 
 Although factoring gender into the scheme of criminal punish-
ment has been commonplace in American history, since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, favoring or disfavoring either sex 
in a sentencing scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.53 Therefore, death penalty statutes no longer 
contain any mention or consideration of gender.54 Despite their facial 
neutrality, however, most capital statutes, including the one in Texas, 
are drafted in ways that make it more likely that men will be charged 
with capital crimes.55 
 State legislatures are responsible for deciding which crimes should 
be death penalty-eligible.56 In Texas, one such crime is capital murder, 
which includes intentional killing, intentional acts which are dangerous 
to human life, and felony murder.57 To further narrow these death-
                                                                                                                      
 
52 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); Reza, supra note 38, at 
182−86; infra Part II. See generally Rapaport, supra note 17 (explaining the impact of gender 
on clemency decisions). 
53 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972); Rapaport, supra note 12, at 588−89. 
Furman v. Georgia was a consolidation of three death penalty cases. 408 U.S. at 238 (con-
solidating Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas). The Court found that 
the imposition of capital punishment in each of the three cases violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Each of the five justices in support of the judgment filed his 
own opinion and some justices suggested that the unconstitutionality was based on the 
death penalty’s arbitrary or prejudicial application. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(noting that the death penalty violates the Constitution if it allows for prejudicial applica-
tion); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (calling imposition of the death penalty “wanton” 
and “freakish”). 
54 See Streib, supra note 8, at 616. Gender is an express consideration in some state cap-
ital punishment statutes but only with regards to pregnant women. Id. 
55 See § 19.03; Streib, supra note 8, at 616; Kopec, supra note 16, at 355. 
56 See Streib, supra note 8, at 615. 
57 § 19.02(b). 
A person commits an offense if he: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; 
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly danger-
ous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or 
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in 
the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in imme-
diate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to 
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eligible crimes, the Texas statute includes several aggravating factors.58 
Aggravating factors are indicators of blameworthiness, and a finding of 
at least one aggravating factor is required for a death sentence.59 
 Many legislatures also include mitigating factors in their death 
penalty statutes.60 Mitigating factors are circumstances that should cause 
a jury to afford a certain amount of leniency to a defendant and can 
justify a sentence of life imprisonment for an offender who might oth-
erwise receive the death penalty.61 Interestingly, many of the aggravating 
factors in capital punishment statutes apply disproportionately to men, 
and many of the mitigating circumstances apply disproportionately to 
women.62 
A. Aggravating Factors 
 Texas’s death penalty statute includes the following aggravating 
factors: murder of a public safety officer or firefighter in the line of 
duty; murder during the commission of specified felonies (kidnapping, 
burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, arson, and terroristic threat); mur-
der for hire; multiple murders; murder during a prison escape; murder 
of a correctional officer; murder of a judge; murder by a state prison 
inmate who is serving a lifetime sentence for certain offenses; and 
murder of an individual under six years of age.63 All of these factors, 
                                                                                                                      
 
commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an in-
dividual. 
Id. One who commits murder as defined in § 19.02(b) is eligible for the death penalty only 
if at least one aggravating circumstance is present. See §§ 12.31, 19.03. 
58 See § 19.03; Reza, supra note 38, at 185−86; infra Part II.A. 
59 See Streib, supra note 8, at 618. 
60 See id.; Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Center, http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty (last visited May 8, 2011). 
61 See Streib, supra note 8, at 618 (noting that juries find two common mitigating fac-
tors—acting under duress or emotional disturbance and acting under the substantial do-
mination of another—more often in women’s cases). 
62 See id. at 616−19 (discussing the disparate impact of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances in death penalty statutes). 
63 § 19.03(a). The Texas Penal Code states: 
(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined 
under Section 19.02(b)(1) and: 
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the 
lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace 
officer or fireman; 
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of commit-
ting or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated 
sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under 
Section 22.07(a)(1),(3),(4),(5) or (6); 
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with the exception of murder of an individual under six years of age, 
apply predominantly to crimes committed by male defendants.64 
  The commission of felony murder, for example, is a commonly 
applied aggravating factor both nationally and in Texas.65 Nearly eighty 
percent of inmates on death row in the United States received their 
sentences after felony murder convictions.66 Women, however, commit 
only six percent of felony murders, a number out of proportion with 
their percentage of murder arrests generally.67 
 Another commonly occurring aggravating factor in Texas is the 
commission of murder for hire.68 Regardless of the gender of the hirer, 
men are almost always the contractors in murder for hire cases.69 Yet 
another aggravating factor with a statistical gender disparity is the com-
mission of multiple murders.70 While women commit ten percent of 
                                                                                                                      
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remunera-
tion or the promise of remuneration; 
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to es-
cape from a penal institution; 
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another: 
(A) who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or 
(B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combina-
tion or in the profits of a combination; 
(6) the person: 
(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 
19.02, murders another; or 
(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years 
for an offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03, murders another; 
(7) the person murders more than one person: 
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or 
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are com-
mitted pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct; 
(8) the person murders an individual under six years of age; or 
(9) the person murders another person in retaliation for or on account of 
the service or status of the other person as a judge or justice of the su-
preme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, a district 
court, a criminal district court, a constitutional county court, a statutory 
county court, a justice court, or a municipal court. 
Id. 
64 See infra notes 65−75 and accompanying text. 
65 See Streib, supra note 8, at 617; Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, supra note 60 
(showing that felony murders are death-eligible crimes under most state laws). 
66 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 355. 
67 See id.; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 (showing that women account for 
ten percent of murder arrests). 
68 See § 19.03(a)(3); Streib, supra note 8, at 616. 
69 See Streib, supra note 8, at 616. 
70 See Jack Broom, Death Penalty Rare for Women, Seattle Times, Dec. 30, 2007, at B1. 
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murders generally, they commit only five percent of multiple mur-
ders.71 
 Finally, the fact that women are less likely than men to have crimi-
nal histories impacts several of the Texas aggravating factors, such as 
killing by a lifetime inmate, killing during a prison escape, or killing of 
a correctional officer or judge.72 Typically, female killers have not had 
the prior experience with the penal system necessary to satisfy these 
factors.73 Rather, as discussed above, female offenders are most likely to 
commit domestic homicides, killing their husbands, lovers, relatives, or 
children.74 Under most current statutory schemes, these domestic 
homicides are seen as less serious than other types of murders (includ-
ing felony murder).75 
B. Mitigating Circumstances 
 Mitigating circumstances are essentially the opposite of aggravat-
ing factors because they provide guidance to juries about what makes 
offenders deserve sympathy and leniency.76 Most mitigating circum-
stances also seem to provide more protection to women than they do to 
men.77 For example, one common mitigating circumstance is the exis-
tence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” a trait more often 
associated with women than men.78 Another consideration is whether 
the defendant is under the “substantial domination” of another per-
son.79 Juries commonly apply this factor to women because many jurors 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. 
72 See § 19.03; Streib, supra note 8, at 617−18. 
73 See Streib, supra note 8, at 617−18, 626. 
74 See id. The Texas Penal Code permits leniency in punishment during a capital case if 
the offender acts “under the immediate influence of sudden passion.” § 19.02(d). Domes-
tic homicides often fall into this category. See Streib, supra note 8, at 617−18. 
75 See Streib, supra note 8, at 615. Defendants who kill family members are punished 
less harshly than defendants who kill non-family members. See Schmall, supra note 7, at 
312. Interestingly, it also seems that domestic homicides where the victim is a woman are 
seen as less serious than domestic homicides where the victim is a man. See id. Men who kill 
their romantic partners are less likely to be charged with first or second degree murder 
than women who kill their husbands or lovers. Id. This reinforces the evil woman theory 
and makes a frightening statement about the public acceptance of traditional domestic 
violence. See id.; supra Part I.C. 
76 See Streib, supra note 8, at 618−19. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. (“[J]udges and juries generally are more likely to find duress or emotional 
disturbance for female offenders than for male offenders in homicide cases.”). 
79 Id. 
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assume that women commit crimes only because of their commitments 
to their husbands or lovers.80 
 The Texas Penal Code, however, does not lay out specific mitigat-
ing factors.81 Instead, it contains a “catch-all” provision that allows a 
jury to consider any and all characteristics of a particular defendant 
when deciding whether to sentence that defendant to death.82 Al-
though seemingly innocuous, such catch-all provisions also discrimi-
nate against men because “[j]udges and juries generally are more likely 
to find sympathetic factors in the lives and backgrounds of women than 
of men.”83 Although this may be explained partially by the reluctance 
of male defendants to expose vulnerable or sympathetic aspects of their 
lives, the fact that women receive greater public empathy is undeni-
able.84 In addition, judges and juries are more likely to see women as 
capable of rehabilitation, an element that often factors into a sentenc-
ing decision.85 
on its face, the gender bias inherent in its application may make it un-
                                                                                                                     
III. Bias Within the Legal System 
 Assuming, arguendo, that the Texas death penalty statute is valid 
 
80 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 306. 
81 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Many states no longer 
limit a jury to a specific list of mitigating factors because after the Supreme Court decision 
in Lockett v. Ohio, an individualized determination of mitigating factors is constitutionally 
required. 438 U.S. 586, 608−09 (1978). Interestingly, Lockett, the defendant, was female, a 
factor that the Supreme Court may have consciously or unconsciously wanted a jury to be 
able to consider. See id. at 589. 
82 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(e)(1) (West 2006). A capital jury must 
decide 
[w]hether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including circum-
stances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the 
personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating 
circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole rather than a death sentence be imposed. 
Id. 
83 See Streib, supra note 8, at 619. For example, after the passage of the Violence 
Against Women Act in 1994, female defendants are able to introduce evidence of battered 
women’s syndrome during a presentation of mitigating circumstances. O’Shea, supra note 
11, at 17. More than half of the women on death row in 1999 had been victims of abuse. 
See id. 
84 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 288−89 (explaining that female victims who had abusive 
childhoods are afforded more sympathy than male victims); Streib, supra note 8, at 619 
(noting the unwillingness of male defendants to expose sympathetic factors). 
85 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 356. 
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constitutional.86 There is overt evidence of gender discrimination 
throughout all stages of a capital case in Texas—from the decision to 
prosecute through the trial, sentencing, and clemency proceedings.87 
A. Charging a Defendant with a Capital Crime 
 Before a jury is faced with the difficulty of hearing a capital case, 
the district attorney’s office must decide whether to even seek the 
death penalty.88 For many prosecutors, this decision comes down to 
whether the case is winnable, an evaluation that can automatically 
eliminate some female defendants.89 “‘Almost all prosecutors think 
about their odds of winning the death penalty case . . . and if the de-
fendant is a woman, then the odds are much less.’”90 Therefore, female 
defendants are at an advantage before the trial even begins.91 
 Furthermore, a prosecutor’s decision may be influenced by the pub-
lic because “‘[t]he decision to seek the death penalty is often tied to poli-
tics and community outrage rather than to the heinousness of the homi-
cide.’”92 The public tends to have a paternalistic attitude towards women 
who remain in their stereotypical roles, which may protect women from 
community outrage and thus from the most serious penalties.93 
B. The Trial and Sentencing 
 Not only do female defendants benefit from a lower likelihood of 
being charged with capital crimes, but female defendants also use emo-
                                                                                                                      
86 See, e.g., Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (finding un-
constitutional gender bias against a male co-defendant during the trial and sentencing 
stages of a murder case). 
87 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 (noting that many judges have admitted to 
treating women with more leniency than men); Kopec, supra note 16, at 356 (noting that 
judges and juries are more likely to view women as sympathetic and capable of rehabilita-
tion); S. Carolina Confronts Death Penalty for Women, supra note 17. See generally Rapaport, 
supra note 17 (discussing gender bias in governors’ decisions to grant clemency). 
88 See O’Shea, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that the district attorney holds the power to 
decide whether to charge a defendant with first-degree murder, offer a plea bargain, sub-
mit a first-degree murder charge to a jury, ask for a death sentence, affirm the conviction 
of a death sentence, and execute a death sentence). 
89 See S. Carolina Confronts Death Penalty for Women, supra note 17. 
90 Id. (quoting a statement by Professor Victor L. Streib). 
91 See id. 
92 Amy L. Edwards & Susan Jacobson, Few Women Face Execution—But Will Casey An-
thony?, Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 16, 2008, at A1 (quoting Richard Dieter, Executive Direc-
tor of the Death Penalty Information Center). 
93 See id.; supra Part I.B. 
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tional tactics to gain the sympathy of juries in the courtroom.94 Many 
defense attorneys counsel their female clients to cry profusely on the 
stand, to shake uncontrollably, or to hang their heads in shame.95 Por-
traying women as damaged and fragile can be a strong defense tactic 
because it “lumps women in with the retarded and children by implying 
that they can’t control their own actions.”96 For example, women who 
kill their abusive spouses are represented as helpless victims.97 Another 
tactic is to portray a female defendant as traditionally feminine, espe-
cially as a mother or grandmother.98 Even supposedly impartial judges 
admit to treating women with more leniency and mercy.99 
 Furthermore, mothers and grandmothers defy the typical image of 
brute murderers and make it difficult for a jury to reconcile these two 
conflicting images.100 For example, Dorothea Puente was a grand-
mother who lived in an adorable home and grew rhododendrons in her 
front yard when the police found seven corpses buried on her prop-
erty.101 Puente had killed the elderly tenants that lived in her boarding 
house in order to collect their government checks, but she narrowly es-
caped the death penalty, some say due to her gender and age.102 
 In order to obtain a death sentence, prosecutors must overcome 
this gender hurdle.103 One prosecutorial tactic is to “de-feminize” de-
fendants by portraying them as lesbians or gang leaders.104 In fact, “les-
bians are also convicted and sentenced to death at disproportionately 
high rates” and at least two of the twelve women executed since 1976 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 11; Jack Elliott Jr., Women on Death Row Are Rare: Three 
Miss. Inmates Facing Execution for Murder Convictions, Comm. Appeal, Oct. 9, 2007, at B7 
(“[D]efense attorneys go to great lengths to make sure jurors will be sympathetic [to fe-
male defendants].”). 
95 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 11. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 94; see also Schmall, supra note 7, at 314 (“‘[S]ociety 
doesn’t want to be reminded that mothers and grandmothers are destined to die against 
their will.’” (quoting Lane Nelson, Death Watch: Women on the Row, Angolite, Sept.-Oct. 
1995, at 17)). 
99 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456. 
100 See Scott Smith, Could Gender Spare Huckaby?: Death Penalty Seldom Meted Out to Wom-
en, Record (Stockton, Cal.) (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20090920/A_NEWS/909200310/-1/NEWSMAP. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See Schmall, supra note 7, at 314 (noting that juries have trouble convicting a wom-
an if she is a mother, a widow, attractive, or if she cries on the stand). 
104 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 11. 
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were gay.105 Furthermore, jurors respond to de-feminization attempts 
more often when the defendant is an ethnic minority; black women 
account for two-thirds of executions since the 1700s.106 Finally, the most 
popular way to de-feminize a female offender is to show that she has 
violated her duties as a wife, mother, and caretaker.107 Juries tend to be 
more comfortable convicting and sentencing women who have strayed 
from their expected roles in society.108 
C. Clemency and Commutation 
 In 1981, Guinevere Garcia confessed to the murder of her infant 
daughter and received a ten-year prison sentence.109 Four months after 
her release, she killed her husband and received a death sentence.110 
Garcia refused to appeal and rejected all efforts and assistance from 
public interest groups.111 Despite her efforts, she was eventually 
saved.112 Mere hours prior to her scheduled execution, Illinois Gover-
nor Jim Edgar commuted Garcia’s sentence to life in prison.113 This was 
his first use of clemency in his five years in office.114 
                                                                                                                     
  While Texas governors rarely grant clemency, even Texas gover-
nors can feel trepidation when sending a woman to her death.115 Be-
 
 
105 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 459; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. Wanda 
Jean Allen was executed in 2001 after killing her gay lover in front of a police station. See 
Kopec, supra note 16, at 361−62. In 2002, Aileen Wuornos, a former prostitute, was exe-
cuted for the murders of six of her “customers.” Id. at 362−63. Wuornos’s lesbian lover was 
used as the prosecution’s chief witness against her. Id. Wuornos’s case received a large 
amount of media attention—the movie Monster, starring Charlize Theron, tells her story. 
See Streib, supra note 8, at 611. For both Allen and Wuornos, sexuality played a prominent 
role during trial, indicating that women are punished more harshly for straying from gen-
der expectations with regards to sexuality. See Kopec, supra note 16, at 361−63. 
106 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 458. 
107 See id. at 459; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
108 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 458; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358. 
109 Schmall, supra note 7, at 294−96. 
110 See id. 
111 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 10; Schmall, supra note 7, at 296. 
112 Schmall, supra note 7, at 285. In a tape-recorded message to the governor, Garcia 
pleaded: “‘Do not consider this petition based on the fact that I am a woman. If you grant 
this petition, you are sending a message to every woman in this state that the death penalty 
applies only to men.’” Id. at 286. 
113 See Rueter, supra note 19, at 10. 
114 Id. 
115 See Lise Olsen, Perry Uses Clemency Sparingly on Death Row: Governor Has Never Called 
Off an Execution on a Claim of Innocence, Houston Chron., Oct. 18, 2009, at A1; see also 
George W. Bush, A Charge To Keep: My Journey to the White House 154 (2001). In 
his first nine years in office, Governor Perry of Texas granted only one reprieve for a death 
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fore the execution of Karla Faye Tucker, former governor George W. 
Bush received desperate pleas to spare her life.116 Governor Bush re-
fused to commute her sentence and used the opportunity to make a 
statement about the equal application of the death penalty.117 He said, 
“‘When I was sworn in as the Governor of Texas, I took an oath of of-
fice to uphold the laws of our state, including the death penalty. My 
responsibility is to ensure our laws are enforced fairly and evenly with-
out preference or special treatment . . . .’”118 Bush's spokeswoman, 
Karen Hughes, further stated that “[t]he gender of the murderer did 
not make any difference to the victims” in an attempt to indicate that 
the governor made decisions without regard to the gender of the ac-
cused.119 
 Despite his seemingly gender-blind view of the death penalty, Bush 
later admitted in his autobiography that reading the above statement 
was “one of the hardest things” he had ever done and that awaiting 
Tucker’s execution “felt like a huge piece of concrete was crushing 
me.”120 As governor of Texas, Bush sent 152 inmates to their death, 
some of whom still claimed actual innocence.121 It is telling that the 
minutes spent awaiting the execution of Tucker, an admittedly guilty 
axe murderer, were the most excruciating of his career.122 
IV. The Executed Women 
 Since 1976, Texas has executed only three women: Karla Faye 
Tucker, Betty Lou Beets, and Frances Newton.123 All three of these 
women were cast into the “evil woman” category and therefore lost the 
protection of the biased Texas system.124 
                                                                                                                      
row inmate claiming innocence. Olsen, supra. That reprieve went to female defendant, 
Frances Newton, who was later executed. Id.; infra Part IV.C (discussing Newton’s case). 
116 Atwell, supra note 49, at 79. Karla Faye Tucker’s case is discussed in more detail in 
Part IV.A, infra. 
117 See Bush, supra note 115, at 154. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 145. 
120 See id. at 154. 
121 Helen Prejean, Death in Texas, N.Y. Rev., Jan. 13, 2005, at 4. 
122 Atwell, supra note 49, at 64; Bush, supra note 115, at 155 (“Karla Faye Tucker was 
pronounced dead at 6:45 P.M. Those remain the longest twenty minutes of my tenure as 
Governor.”). 
123 Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
124 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 215; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358−63. 
2011] Executing Women in Texas: An Equal Protection Challenge 421 
A. Karla Faye Tucker 
 Karla Faye Tucker is perhaps the most notorious woman ever to 
receive the death penalty, in part because she was white, eloquent, and 
attractive.125 Tucker had a troubled childhood and was a drug-addicted 
prostitute at the time of her arrest for the murder of two people.126 In 
June of 1983, Tucker, her boyfriend, and another acquaintance decided 
to break into Jerry Lynn Dean’s home to intimidate him or perhaps to 
steal motorcycle parts.127 After breaking into the home, Tucker woke 
Dean by straddling him before she and her boyfriend struck him several 
times with a pickaxe.128 After Dean was dead, Tucker noticed another 
body in the bed, a woman Dean had met at a bar that evening.129 
Tucker attacked her with the pickaxe as well, allowing her boyfriend to 
finish the woman off.130 
cent.135 
                                                                                                                     
 The prosecution emphasized Tucker’s later comment that she 
reached a sexual climax with every swing of the pickaxe.131 Tucker ex-
hibited a masculine proclivity for sex and violence, and the jury there-
fore sentenced her to death.132 While in prison, Tucker stopped using 
drugs and alcohol, became a devout Evangelical Christian, and eventu-
ally married the prison chaplain.133 Even so, Tucker was the first 
woman executed in Texas since the Civil War.134 Directly after her exe-
cution, Texan support for the death penalty dropped from eighty-five 
percent to sixty-eight per
 
125 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 63; Rapaport, supra note 12, at 591 (“[Tucker’s] wan, 
pixie-ish good looks, her youthfulness, her wry, self-deprecating humor, and her self-
possession, articulateness and thoughtfulness, captivated television audiences.”). 
126 Atwell, supra note 49, at 64, 66. 
127 Id. at 64−65; Rapaport, supra note 12, at 591. 
128 Atwell, supra note 49, at 65. 
129 Id. at 65−66. 
130 Id. at 66. 
131 See id. at 68, 71. 
132 See id. at 71. 
133 See Rapaport, supra note 12, at 591. Tucker did appear to be the poster-child for re-
form and, on appeal, she raised a Fourteenth Amendment claim, arguing that although 
female prisoners are more likely to be rehabilitated, a woman had never been granted 
clemency on the basis of rehabilitation. Atwell, supra note 49 at 76–77. 
134 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 64. 
135 Id. at 83. Regarding the drop in support for the death penalty, Texas Poll Director 
Ty Meighan stated, “Some of it has got to be people re-evaluating their opinion in light of 
the Karla Faye Tucker execution.” See Kathy Walt, Death Penalty’s Support Plunges to a 30-Year 
Low: Karla Faye Tucker’s Execution Tied to Texans’ Attitude Change, Houston Chron., Mar. 15, 
1998, at A1. This was due in part to the success of Tucker’s public relations campaign. See 
id. Dianne Clements, president of Justice for All, stated, “They brought her into our living 
rooms and wanted to make her a part of our lives.” Id. 
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 Tucker’s case is especially interesting because she was sentenced to 
death when she failed to fit into a feminine role, yet given public sym-
pathy when she conformed.136 At the time of her trial, Tucker was a 
violent and over-sexualized prostitute and thus lost the protection of 
femininity.137 By the time of her execution, however, she had trans-
formed into the loving Christian wife society expected her to be, thus 
sparking public outrage and disapproval at her fate.138 
B. Betty Lou Beets 
 Betty Lou Beets had been in a series of abusive relationships be-
fore shooting and killing her fifth husband, Jimmy Don Beets.139 Jimmy 
was missing for two years before police found his body buried in a 
sleeping bag in the family’s front yard, alongside the body of one of 
Beets’s previous husbands.140 The prosecution asserted that Beets killed 
her husbands for the life insurance money and portrayed her as a 
greedy “black widow” who systematically preyed on her lovers.141 But 
the most shocking offense, the prosecution argued, was that she cor-
rupted her children by employing her adult son and daughter to help 
hide the two bodies.142 
 Beets thus defied her role not only as a wife but also as a mother.143 
She was a “corrupter of the home” who “used her ultimate feminine 
power—motherhood—to implicate her children in her own wrongdo-
                                                                                                                      
136 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 63−83; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 459 (discussing the 
protections afforded by “ladylike” behavior and the dangers created by rejection of it). On 
appeal, Tucker argued that the media created an improper bias against female defendants. 
See Atwell, supra note 49, at 76–77. Because the high profile case spurned discussion 
about “equal justice,” Tucker argued that she was sentenced to death solely as to send a 
message of gender equality. See id. Thus, “she would be executed because she was a woman.” 
Id. at 76. 
137 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 63−83. 
138 See Rapaport, supra note 12, at 591; see also Kopec, supra note 16, at 355 (noting that 
there was “public outcry” after Tucker’s execution). 
139 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 104−08; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. The 
fact that Beets was abused by her husband may actually have worked against her, since the 
state can claim an additional motive of revenge in cases where there is a history of domes-
tic violence. Atwell, supra note 49, at 118. Also, although the state belabored the fact that 
Jimmy Don Beets was Beets’s fifth husband, the jury was not informed that she was his 
fourth wife. Id. at 113. 
140 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 108; Kopec, supra note 16, at 360. 
141 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 108−10. Beets’s gender made this motive more credi-
ble. Id. at 118. “It is easy for a jury to believe a woman (who has no resources or legacy of 
her own) would kill a man, the rightful owner of the family property.” Id. 
142 See id. at 109; Kopec, supra note 16, at 360−61. 
143 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 360−61. 
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ing.”144 Beets was executed in 2000 and was the fourth woman executed 
in the United States since 1976.145 
C. Frances Newton 
 Frances Newton was executed on September 14, 2005, and was the 
eleventh woman to have been executed in the United States since 
1976.146 Newton was sentenced to death for the murders of her husband 
Adrian, and her two children (Alton, age seven and Farrah, age twenty-
one months).147 
 During the trial, Newton was portrayed as “promiscuous and 
greedy.”148 The district attorney focused on Newton’s extramarital af-
fair and the fact that she had previously taken out insurance policies on 
her husband and children.149 The prosecutor, who had also prosecuted 
the case against Karla Faye Tucker, painted a picture of a coldhearted 
woman who wished to collect the insurance money and run off with 
her lover.150 The prosecutor’s closing powerfully condemned Newton 
for betraying the trust of her children.151 He stated, 
What does it tell us about a person that can pick up . . . their 
own 21-month-old child that they personally bore . . . [and] 
look that baby in the eye and what do you suppose that little 
baby, what does a 21-month old baby think towards its mother. 
Love. That’s all a baby has. . . . What does it tell us about a per-
son who could look in that baby’s eyes and execute them?152 
                                                                                                                      
144 Id. During her trial, Beets actually attempted to place blame for the murder on her 
son, Robbie. Atwell, supra note 49, at 110. The prosecutor used this defense to further 
attack Beets’s performance as a mother saying, “What kind of a mother would seek to pin a 
murder on her own child? The female of the species protects the young, above all, above 
her own life.” Id. at 111. 
145 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. Newton claimed innocence and stated that she and her cousin called the po-
lice after returning home and finding that her family had been shot to death. See Atwell, 
supra note 49, at 208−09. Newton believed that the murders had been committed by a drug 
dealer to whom her husband owed money. See id. at 212. 
148 Atwell, supra note 49, at 210. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. at 208, 210. 
151 See id. at 215. 
152 Id. 
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According to many, a mother’s killing of her young child is the ultimate 
rejection of feminine identity.153 The prosecutor’s reference to New-
ton’s pregnancy highlights a woman’s unique role as the bearer and 
protector of children.154 In violating that role, Newton joined Tucker 
and Beets in rejecting her femininity and condemning herself to a 
masculine fate.155 
D. Death Row Today 
 Ten women are currently on death row in Texas.156 As is typical in 
Texas, most of these condemned women have committed “domestic” 
crimes or crimes that are otherwise at odds with a woman’s stereotypi-
cal gender role.157 In fact, only two of the ten women presently on 
Texas’s death row earned a place there without targeting vulnerable 
victims such as children, the mentally retarded, or the elderly.158 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 361 (naming infanticide as the “ultimate anti-feminine 
act”). 
154 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 214−15; Kopec, supra note 16, at 361. 
155 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 214−15; Kopec, supra note 16, at 358 (“[B]y ‘acting 
out’ from the duties of [feminine] roles, [female] defendants defiled society’s notions of 
womanhood and lost the protection that femininity typically affords them in the jury 
room.”); supra Part IV.A–C. 
156 Offenders on Death Row, Tex. Department of Crim. Just., http://www.tdcj.state.tx. 
us/stat/offendersondrow.htm (last visited May 8, 2011). There are 314 people on death 
row in Texas. Gender and Racial Statistics of Death Row Offenders, Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 
http://tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/racial.htm (last visited May 8, 2011); Offenders on Death Row, 
supra. 
157 See Case Summaries for Current Female Death Row Inmates, Death Penalty Info. Cen-
ter, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/case-summaries-current-female-death-row-inmates 
(last visited May 8, 2011); Fate of Texas Women’s Death Row Inmate May Be in Governor’s Hands, 
supra note 4; Offenders on Death Row, supra note 156. The women currently on death row 
include: Melissa Lucio (convicted of the beating and murder of her daughter); Chelsea 
Richardson (convicted of murdering two adults while they were in their home); Erica 
Sheppard (convicted of murdering a woman during an attempt to steal a car); Linda Carty 
(convicted of the kidnapping and murder of a young woman and the kidnapping of her 
three-day-old baby); Suzanne Basso (convicted of murdering a mentally retarded man after 
luring him with promises of marriage); Kimberly McCarthy (a nursing home therapist 
convicted of murdering a seventy-one-year-old woman); Brittany Holberg (a prostitute 
convicted of murdering an eighty-year-old client); Darlie Routier (convicted of the stab-
bing murder of her five-year-old son); Lisa Coleman (convicted of the murder of a nine 
year old boy); and Cathy Henderson (convicted of the murder of an infant she was respon-
sible for babysitting). See id. 
158 See Offenders on Death Row, supra note 156. Only Chelsea Richardson and Erica 
Sheppard have a different profile. See Kopec, supra note 16, at 358; Offenders on Death Row, 
supra note 156. 
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V. The Fourteenth Amendment Challenge 
 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons in the United 
States equal protection of the laws.159 The application of the death 
penalty in Texas shows that men may not receive equal protection dur-
ing the various stages of a capital case in Texas.160 Some have argued 
that the best way to attack the death penalty on Equal Protection Clause 
grounds is to raise the challenge in those states that have capital pun-
ishment but have never executed a woman.161 The case seems even 
stronger in Texas, however, because even in Texas, a state that has exe-
cuted more women than almost any other, application of capital pun-
ishment may still be unconstitutionally gender biased.162 
 Although facially neutral, Texas’s capital punishment statute has 
an unconstitutional disparate impact on male offenders.163 While 
women commit 10% of homicides, they account for only 0.6% of exe-
cutions in Texas.164 This disparity is much too stark to be explainable by 
other reasoning and amounts to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.165 
There is also implicit discrimination in the Texas death penalty statute 
itself.166 The statute uses factors that apply disproportionally to male 
offenders to determine whether a defendant is death-eligible and per-
                                                                                                                      
159 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) 
160 See generally Kopec, supra note 16 (making a similar argument about the unconstitu-
tionality of Virginia’s capital murder statute); supra Parts II–III. 
161 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 364 (arguing that Virginia’s death penalty scheme vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment because no women have been executed in the state since 
1976). 
162 See id.; State by State Database, supra note 13; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 
(showing that Texas and Oklahoma lead the country in female executions). 
163 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); State by State Database, 
supra note 13; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
164 See State by State Database, supra note 13 (showing that Texas has executed 467 peo-
ple); Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6 (showing that only three of those people 
were women, but noting that women commit ten percent of homicides). 
165 See Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (M.D.N.C. 2000); Kopec, supra note 
16, at 373. In Williams v. Currie, the petitioner and his male co-defendant received twenty-
three- to twenty-seven-year sentences for shooting into various homes and cars, while their 
female co-defendant, Jamie Forehand, received only an eight-month sentence. 103 F. 
Supp. 2d at 859−61. Finding that the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights had been 
violated, the court noted, “The only truly noticeable difference between Forehand and her 
two [male] co-defendants is gender. This record is sufficient to allow a finding that gender 
discrimination accounts for most, if not all, of the more than twenty-year gap between 
plaintiff’s total sentence and Forehand’s total sentence.” Id. at 868. 
166 See § 19.03; supra Part II. 
426 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:405 
mits unguided consideration of mitigating circumstances, which allows 
juries to rely on gender-based stereotypes and paternalistic attitudes 
when making sentencing decisions.167 
 Furthermore, the Texas statute is unconstitutional not only because 
of discriminatory application during the initial determination of death 
eligibility, but also because legal and political actors treat male offenders 
more harshly.168 Juries convict women of murder less frequently than 
they convict men, and they tend to convict women of lesser degrees of 
murder, which carry lighter sentences.169 Judges, politicians, and the 
general public also treat women with leniency and purposefully give 
them protections and considerations to which men are not entitled.170 
In the rare instances when women do receive death sentences, they are 
even more rarely executed.171 Whereas nearly forty-five percent of men 
on death row are eventually executed, this figure may be as low as six-
teen percent for women.172 Since the reinstitution of the death penalty, 
                                                                                                                      
 
167 See § 19.03; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(e)(1) (West 2006); Streib, su-
pra note 8, at 616−20; see also State v. White (White II ), 982 P.2d 819, 828 (Ariz. 1999) (al-
lowing a jury to find that being a “caring mother” was a mitigating circumstance in a fe-
male co-defendant’s case while rejecting that being a “caring father” was a mitigating 
circumstance in her husband’s case). 
168 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 (noting that many judges have admitted to 
treating women with more leniency than men); Kopec, supra note 16, at 357 (discussing 
that judges and juries are more likely to view women as sympathetic and capable of reha-
bilitation); S. Carolina Confronts Death Penalty for Women, supra note 17 (explaining that 
prosecutors often shy away from charging women with capital crimes). 
169 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 451−52. 
170 See Rapaport, supra note 12, at 584−85 (explaining that the “sheer unusualness” of a 
female facing capital punishment causes judges, politicians, jurists, and the press to afford 
a woman’s case “closer scrutiny”); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 (revealing that some 
judges admit to being knowingly more lenient towards women). There may also be politi-
cal reasons to treat women with more leniency: George W. Bush, who oversaw more than 
120 executions during his governorship, reported “the concern felt in his administration 
that the execution of a woman would make him and the State of Texas appear inhumane 
and ‘bloodthirsty.’” Rapaport, supra note 12, at 585 (quoting Bush, supra note 115, at 146). 
Even judges with lifetime tenure worry that ordering the execution of a woman would 
cause them to lose public support. See id. 
171 See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, Death Penalty 
Info. Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 
(last visited May 8, 2011); State by State Database, supra note 13; Women and the Death Penalty, 
supra note 6. Since the reinstitution of the death penalty in 1976, Texas has meted out 905 
death sentences to men and nineteen to women. See Death Sentences in the United States from 
1977 by State and by Year, supra; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. While 464 of those 
men have been executed, only three of those women have been executed. See State by State 
Database, supra note 13; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
172 See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra note 171; 
Executions per Death Sentence, Death Penalty Info. Center, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/executions-death-sentence (last visited May 8, 2011) (showing that the overall 
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nineteen death sentences were imposed upon women in Texas, but only 
three of those women were actually executed.173 This is due in part to 
the purposeful consideration of gender by governors and judges during 
the process of granting reversals and stays.174 
 Despite this potential gender discrimination, an analysis under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is far from 
straightforward.175 Though a gender-based equal protection challenge 
to the death penalty has the makings of a winning argument, it must 
first overcome certain obstacles, including level of scrutiny, qualifica-
tion of male offenders as a suspect class, facial neutrality, real differ-
ences, and contradictory precedent.176 
A. Level of Scrutiny 
 The success of a Fourteenth Amendment claim often depends on 
the standard of review that courts use when evaluating claims by a given 
group.177 For example, while consideration of discrimination against 
racial and ethnic groups receives strict scrutiny in equal protection 
challenges, the standard for gender-based challenges is somewhat less 
rigid, and an intermediate standard is generally applied.178 Intermedi-
                                                                                                                      
 
rate of executions per death sentence in Texas from 1977 to 2007 was 44.7%); State by State 
Database, supra note 13; Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
173 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
174 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 115, at 155 (showing the Texas governor’s moral struggle 
with executing a woman); Rapaport, supra note 12, at 585; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 
(revealing that some judges admit to being more lenient towards women). 
175 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 465 (predicting difficulty for men in obtaining 
status as a suspect class); Kopec, supra note 16, at 373−82. 
176 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466−67 (1981); Shapiro, supra 
note 17, at 465; Kopec, supra note 16, at 373−82. 
177 See Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to 
Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 185, 188−95 (2003). 
There are three recognized levels of judicial scrutiny. Id. at 188. The first, strict scrutiny, 
requires that a discriminatory law or policy be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest. Id. at 190−91. This has been the standard applied to cases involving 
classifications based on race or national origin. Id. at 192. The second, intermediate scru-
tiny, requires that a classification be substantially related to an important government in-
terest. Id. at 191. The third, rational basis, requires only that a classification be rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. at 188−89. 
178 See id. at 192−93. Traditionally, courts applied only minimal scrutiny to gender clas-
sifications because it was believed that “[w]omen’s proper place was at the center of family 
life, not the market or politics; and, it was constitutional for states to try to protect them 
from the vicissitudes of life when they ventured outside the home.” See id. at 220−21. In the 
1970s, however, perceptions of a woman’s role began to change, and courts began afford-
ing intermediate scrutiny to gender bias claims. See id. at 221−25. Today, it is unclear what 
the standard of review should be for gender classifications—some courts have applied 
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ate review requires only that a discriminatory policy be substantially 
related to an important government interest.179 It is possible, however, 
that courts will apply a stricter standard when hearing a gender-based 
challenge.180 In Frontiero v. Richardson, for example, a military policy 
allowed the spouses of male military service members to receive bene-
fits more easily than the spouses of female military service members.181 
The Court found that the government purpose of administrative ease 
did not pass strict scrutiny and was invalid.182 More recently, in United 
States v. Virginia, the majority opinion held that sex discrimination had 
to be “exceedingly persuasive” in its justification.183 Therefore, one 
could argue that a discriminatory gender classification would receive at 
least intermediate scrutiny, if not strict scrutiny.184 
 It might also be possible that none of this case law or precedent is 
relevant, based on the principle that “death is different.”185 For many 
years, the U.S. Supreme Court has required additional safeguards for 
capital cases that are not required for any other criminal trials.186 The 
rationale behind this special treatment is that because taking a human 
life is the ultimate state sanction, it must be done with as much exact-
ness and deliberation as possible.187 Therefore, regardless of the level 
of scrutiny a gender claim might be given in another scenario, it is pos-
                                                                                                                      
intermediate scrutiny, while others seem to use a higher or lower standard. See id. at 195–
96. For example, in United States v. Virginia (VMI ), Justice Scalia accused the majority of 
using strict scrutiny to evaluate a gender-based claim. See 518 U.S. 515, 571−76 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Later, in Nguyen v. INS, the dissenters voiced concern that the ma-
jority applied rational basis review to a gender-based claim and merely labeled it interme-
diate review. See 533 U.S. 53, 74−78 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
179 See Deutsch, supra note 177, at 191. 
180 See, e.g., VMI, 518 U.S. at 531 (majority opinion); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 690−91 (1973). 
181 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. 
182 Id. at 690−91 (“[W]hen we enter the realm of ‘strict judicial scrutiny,’ there can be 
no doubt that ‘administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of 
which dictates constitutionality.”). 
183 See VMI, 518 U.S. at 531. 
184 See Deutsch, supra note 177, at 270−71. 
185 See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459−60 (1984); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment . . . .”); 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The penalty of death differs from all 
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.”). 
186 See Stefanie Lindeman, Note, Because Death Is Different: Legal and Moral Arguments for 
Broadening Defendants’ Rights to Discovery in Federal Capital Cases, 73 St. John’s L. Rev. 541, 
559 (1999). 
187 See id. at 543. 
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sible that it would receive a stricter level of scrutiny in a capital pun-
ishment context.188 
                                                                                                                     
B. Suspect Class Status 
 The Fourteenth Amendment is generally seen as a way to protect 
individuals in historically marginalized groups from discrimination 
based on their status.189 Therefore, it is somewhat counterintuitive for 
men to be considered a suspect class in an equal protection challenge 
because they are not a historically disadvantaged group.190 In City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., however, the Supreme Court held that all 
racial classifications, even those discriminating against white citizens, 
were subject to the highest standard of scrutiny, a holding that could 
apply equally to gender discrimination against men.191 
  Further, there have been several instances where courts have rec-
ognized valid gender bias claims brought by men.192 In Craig v. Boren, 
for example, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of certain alco-
holic beverages to men under the age of twenty-one and women under 
the age of eighteen.193 After applying an intermediate standard of scru-
tiny, the Supreme Court found that the statute violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one.194 Later, in Orr v. Orr, the Court invalidated a statute that could re-
quire men, but not women, to pay alimony in a divorce proceeding, not-
ing, “The fact that the classification expressly discriminates against men 
rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny.”195 
 
188 See id. at 559. 
189 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218−19 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Kopec, 
supra note 16, at 373. 
190 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 465; Kopec, supra note 16, at 373. 
191 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493−94 (1989). Croson con-
cerned a city’s policy that thirty percent of all contracting work be given to minority-owned 
businesses. Id. at 477−78. The Court held that “the standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a par-
ticular classification,” and that the single standard of review for racial classifications should 
be strict scrutiny. See id. at 493−94. 
192 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (“That this statu-
tory policy discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it from 
scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. In Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan, the Court used an “exceedingly persuasive justification” standard and 
found that a nursing school policy which prohibited the admission of men was invalid 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 458 U.S. at 720−21, 724, 733. 
193 Craig, 429 U.S. at 191−92. 
194 See id. at 204. 
195 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270, 279, 283 (1979). 
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C. Facial Neutrality and Disparate Impact 
 Even if men achieve status as a suspect class in the capital punish-
ment context, they must next overcome the difficulties posed by 
Texas’s facially neutral statute.196 When evaluating equal protection 
claims, the Supreme Court has placed its focus on intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination.197 Thus, statutes creating a disparate impact are 
valid as long as they were not created with a discriminatory purpose.198 
The Texas death penalty statute does not, on its face, discriminate be-
tween men and women.199 While this makes a constitutional challenge 
more difficult, it is still possible that the Court will hold that the statute 
is unconstitutional.200 
 First, it is possible that the disparate impact of the Texas death pen-
alty statute is in fact intentional.201 As discussed earlier, it is not uncom-
mon for judges or governors to feel more sympathy towards or afford 
more leniency to female criminals.202 This prevailing paternalistic atti-
tude could certainly be held by the members of the Texas legislature as 
well.203 If the Texas statute was purposefully constructed to encourage 
convictions for male offenders and protection for female offenders, it 
would be invalid despite its lack of explicit discriminatory language.204 
 Such purposeful discrimination might also exist in the application 
of Texas’s death penalty statute and intentional gender discrimination 
during the pre-trial, trial, or sentencing phases of a capital case might 
also violate a defendant’s equal protection rights.205 In Williams v. Cur-
rie, for example, a U.S. district court found that a male defendant’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated based on a gross disparity 
between his sentence and that of his female co-defendant.206 While the 
                                                                                                                      
196 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265−66 (1977) (noting that “[w]hen 
there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the [legisla-
tive] decision,” judicial deference is not justified and a state action can be considered a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
197 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
198 See id. 
199 See § 19.03. 
200 See Kopec, supra note 16, at 375. 
201 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 115, at 155 (showing the governor’s moral struggle with 
executing a woman); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456 (revealing that some judges admit to 
being more lenient towards women). 
202 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 115, at 154; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456. 
203 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 17, at 456; Streib, supra note 8, at 628; supra Part I.B. 
204 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
205 See Williams, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 868; supra Part III. 
206 See Williams, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
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decision in Williams did not void the relevant punishment statute, a 
court may find a statute unconstitutional when it is applied in such a 
discriminatory way.207 
D. Real Differences 
 There are some circumstances in which the state may constitution-
ally discriminate against one gender on the basis of so-called “real dif-
ferences.”208 In Michael M. v. Superior Court, for example, a California 
statute that punished men, but not women, for statutory rape was chal-
lenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.209 The Court found that 
this discriminatory treatment was justified by the state’s interest in pre-
venting illegitimate teenage pregnancies.210 Because women are not 
biologically capable of impregnating men, the statute was justified by a 
real difference.211 
 In contrast, eligibility for execution involves no such real differ-
ences.212 While there are obviously inherent differences between men 
and women, there is no logical difference that qualifies men, but not 
women, to die for their wrongdoings.213 Even if a real differences ar-
gument were presented, surely no biological difference or state objec-
tive is critical enough to justify violating the equal protection rights of a 
male defendant in a capital case.214 
 Even if the gender discrepancy in death sentences is the result of 
real differences in the types of crimes committed by men and women, 
and even if the aggravating and mitigating factors are constitutional, the 
                                                                                                                      
207 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357, 373−74 (1886) (finding that a neutral 
ordinance requiring permits for laundromat operation could be invalid if enforced in a 
discriminatory manner); Williams, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
208 See Deutsch, supra note 177, at 211. 
209 See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466. 
210 See id. at 467. 
211 See id. This principle was used again in Country v. Parratt, where a forcible rape stat-
ute created harshest penalties for male aggressors who attacked female victims. 684 F.2d 
588, 589, 592−93 (8th Cir. 1982). The statute was upheld based on real differences because 
only female victims of male aggressors can suffer the unique harm of pregnancy. See id. 
212 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“There is . . . overwhelming 
evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not women. . . . It is difficult 
to understand why women have received such favored treatment since the purposes alleg-
edly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes.”). 
213 See id.; Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 858 (Pa. 1974) (holding that a re-
sentencing act that contained minimum sentences for men and not women violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment because gender has no rational relationship to parole eligibility). 
214 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286−87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the extreme 
nature of the death penalty as punishment); Butler, 328 A.2d at 858. 
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statute’s constitutionality is still questionable.215 Stereotypical concep-
tions of gender may be taken into account when defining which sorts of 
crimes are among the worst and which sorts of factors warrant sympa-
thy.216 For example, according to apparent societal standards, “conven-
ience store robbers who kill store clerks should face the death penalty 
more often than mothers who kill their children.”217 Therefore, it is pos-
sible that many of the aggravating factors in the Texas statute are ulti-
mately deemed death-worthy only because of their objective male-
ness.218 
m lower courts, 
a successful gender-based claim is still quite possible.222 
. M
                                                                                                                     
E. Contradictory Precedent 
 The Supreme Court has never heard a gender-based equal protec-
tion challenge to the death penalty.219 In McCleskey v. Kemp, however, 
the Court heard and rejected a race-based equal protection challenge 
to a death penalty statute.220 While some argue that this holding makes 
a gender-based challenge more difficult, McCleskey leaves the door to 
constitutional challenge open wider than it might originally seem.221 
Also, though some negative precedent has emerged fro
1 cCleskey v. Kemp & Challenges to the Death Penalty 
 In 1987, the Supreme Court heard an equal protection challenge 
to the death penalty on the basis of race in McCleskey v. Kemp.223 In sup-
port of his argument, the defendant, an African American male, intro-
duced research known as the Baldus Study, which indicated that African 
American defendants were sentenced to death at disproportionately 
higher rates than white defendants in the state of Georgia.224 The Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by evidence of a 
 
215 See Streib, supra note 8, at 615−19; supra Part II. 
216 See Streib, supra note 8, at 615−19. 
217 Id. at 615. 
218 See Atwell, supra note 49, at 63−86, 104−18, 207−21; Streib, supra note 8, at 615−19. 
219 Atwell, supra note 49, at 27. 
220 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282−83, 319 (1987); infra Part V.E.1. 
221 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282−83, 319; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 461−62; Kopec, su-
pra note 16, at 376−77. 
222 See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 616 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. White 
(White I ), 815 P.2d 869, 882−84 (Ariz. 1991), abrogated by State v. Salazar, 844 P.2d 566 
(Ariz. 1992); Atwell, supra note 49, at 27; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 462−63; see also infra 
Part V.E.2. 
223 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282−83. 
224 See id. at 283, 286; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 429. 
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statistical racial disparity and that a constitutional violation occurs only 
when there is purposeful discrimination against a particular defendant 
 th
er considering that women commit only 10% of 
pit
when predicting whether a defendant will be sentenced to death.234 
     
on e basis of race.225 
 Some scholars believe that McCleskey has, at least temporarily, 
closed off Fourteenth Amendment challenges to death penalty statutes 
by all suspect classes.226 The language in McCleskey indicates a preoccu-
pation with the slippery slope that could occur if statistically based chal-
lenges are accepted as equal protection violations.227 Gender bias 
within the capital punishment system, however, is significantly different 
from racial bias.228 The statistical disparity between condemned men 
and women is far more drastic than the disparity between Caucasians 
and African Americans.229 In 2000, African Americans made up 12.3% 
of the population but accounted for nearly 35% of executions.230 Men, 
however, make up less than half of the population but account for 
more than 99% of executions.231 This statistic shows a dramatically dis-
parate impact even aft
ca al crimes.232 
 Moreover, it is important to note that McCleskey was a five to four 
decision with a strong dissent.233 Justice Brennan and his fellow dis-
senters were disturbed by the fact that the race of a killer and the race 
of a victim are more determinative than many other details of a crime 
                                                                                                                 
225 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 429. 
226 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 461−62. 
227 ther 
minor
ould be extended to apply to claims based on 
hat correlate to membership in other minority 
Id. a
supra note 6. 
ould find that “the 
dea ishment forbidden by the 
Eighth
234
 
 See id. at 429−30. The slippery slope concern applies to other penalties and to o
ity groups. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315−18. 
[I]f we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted 
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as 
to other types of penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests of the ir-
relevant factor of race easily c
unexplained discrepancies t
groups, and even to gender. 
t 31 17 (foo s omitted). 
 Ko ra note 16, at 376. 
5− tnote
228 See pec, sup
 at 376−77229 See id. ; Women and the Death Penalty, 
opec,230 See K  supra note 16, at 376. 
231 See id. at 377. 
232 See Women and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. 
233 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282, 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shapiro, supra note 17, 
at 44 Of the four arshall w5.  dissenters, only Justices Brennan and M
th penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual pun
 and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320. 
 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
434 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:405 
The dissenters were not convinced by the majority’s argument that dis-
crimination must be shown in the case at hand and instead felt that 
such a strong racial disparity was at odds with the concern for rational-
ity in capital sentencing.235 Justice Blackmun noted that “[d]isparate 
enforcement of criminal sanctions ‘destroys the appearance of justice 
and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.’”236 The 
dissent further accused the majority of applying an inappropriate stan-
dard of scrutiny when evaluating the Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenge, noting that a legitimate state interest is not sufficient when deal-
ing with a life or death matter.237 Considering the close vote and 
impassioned minority in McCleskey, it is possible that a change in the 
Court’s composition could result in the overruling of this decision.238 
                                                                                                                     
2. Gender and the Death Penalty—Lower Court Decisions 
 While the Supreme Court has yet to hear an equal protection chal-
lenge to the death penalty on the basis of gender discrimination, sev-
eral lower courts have discussed the issue.239 The resulting decisions 
consider many of the issues inherent in gender-based challenges to fa-
cially neutral statutes.240 For example, many courts have relied on the 
 
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer 
whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this ques-
tion would have been disturbing . . . that it was more likely than not that the 
race of McCleskey’s victim would determine whether he received a death sen-
tence . . . . 
Id. 
235 See id. at 322−23. “The Court’s evaluation of the significance of petitioner’s evi-
dence is fundamentally at odds with our consistent concern for rationality in capital sen-
tencing, and the considerations that the majority invokes to discount that evidence cannot 
justify ignoring its force.” Id. at 322 (arguing that McCleskey should not have to prove 
racial bias in his case in particular and that fear of encouraging other sentencing chal-
lenges is not a valid justification). 
236 Id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555−56 
(1979)). 
237 See id. at 347−8. 
238 See id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 445. 
239 See, e.g., Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 616, 621 (upholding Florida’s death penalty statute 
despite arguments that it was applied in a discriminatory manner against males in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); White I, 815 P.2d at 882−83 
(upholding Arizona’s death penalty statute despite a gender-based equal protection chal-
lenge); Atwell, supra note 49, at 27 (noting that the opportunity for a gender-based death 
penalty challenge has not been foreclosed because the Supreme Court has not yet consid-
ered the issue). 
240 See White II, 982 P.2d at 827−29; State v. Holsinger, 563 P.2d 888, 897−98 (Ariz. 
1977); supra Part V.A–D. 
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challenged statute’s facial neutrality and examined only the specific 
circumstances of a defendant’s case.241 
 In State v. White, Michael White was convicted for murder and ap-
pealed his death sentence on several grounds.242 One of White’s 
grounds for appeal was that his female co-defendant, Susan Johnson, 
received only life imprisonment for her crime.243 The Arizona Supreme 
Court rejected White’s equal protection claim, holding that, after an 
individual evaluation, the sentencing court appropriately found mitigat-
ing circumstances only in Johnson’s case.244 Here, the court relied on 
the facial neutrality of the Arizona death penalty statute and stated, 
“Male murderers are not singled out for capital punishment. The statute 
does not, on its face, distinguish between the sexes.”245 Similarly, in Gal-
loway v. State, the male defendant was sentenced to death, whereas the 
female defendants received plea bargains for lesser sentences.246 Again, 
the court found no gender-based equal protection violation because the 
prosecutor evaluated the defendants as individuals before deciding 
whom to prosecute.247 
 Courts have also been unwilling to acknowledge the stark gender 
disparities created by capital punishment schemes.248 In White, for ex-
ample, the court refused to take into account the fact that although 
                                                                                                                      
241 See, e.g., White I, 815 P.2d at 882−84 (finding mitigating factors in female co-
defendant’s case and holding that “[t]he statute does not, on its face, distinguish between 
the sexes”); Holsinger, 563 P.2d at 897−98 (finding defendant who received a death sen-
tence was not denied equal protection of the laws despite the fact that his wife and co-
defendant received life imprisonment because the trial court found a mitigating circum-
stance in the wife’s case and not the defendant’s). 
242 See White I, 815 P.2d at 871−73. 
243 See id. at 871−73, 882−83. 
244 See id. at 882−83. Years later, in a subsequent appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court 
again considered the sentencing disparity in White’s case. See White II, 982 P.2d at 828−30. 
The court noted that Johnson was a “caring mother” and took into account the devastating 
effect a life sentence would have on her young daughter. Id. The court noted that being a 
“caring father” was not equivalent to being a “caring mother” in this instance. See id. In the 
prior appeal, the court noted that Johnson’s difficult marriage and divorce were mitigating 
factors and that all twelve jurors recommended leniency for Johnson. See White I, 815 P.2d 
at 882−83. This exemplifies the tendency of juries to find sympathetic factors primarily in 
the lives of females. See White II, 982 P.2d at 828−30; White I, 815 P.2d at 882−83; Streib, 
supra note 8, at 619. 
245 See White I, 815 P.2d at 882−84. 
246 See Galloway v. State, No. 73766, 2003 WL 1712559, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 
2003). 
247 See id. In this case, Galloway and his friends hatched a plan to lure a stranger to 
their motel room to kill and rob him. Id. at *1. The defendant’s girlfriend lured the victim 
to the motel, where Galloway and a male friend killed him. Id. 
248 See, e.g., State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 157 (Tenn. 2008); White I, 815 P.2d at 882−84. 
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women commit ten percent of Arizona homicides, no women had been 
executed under the current statute.249 Dismissing this data, the court 
stated, “‘[N]either the federal constitution nor this court has ever re-
quired that the imposition of the death penalty precisely reflect the 
composition of the general population.’”250 A statistical argument was 
also raised in State v. Banks, where a Tennessee death row inmate chal-
lenged his sentence on the grounds that Tennessee’s death row housed 
ninety-two men but only two women.251 The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the discrimination could be explained on other 
grounds, such as fewer commissions of capital crimes by women.252 
 Thus far, American courts have held tightly to the notion that a dis-
criminatory impact does not violate equal protection absent a discrimi-
natory purpose.253 The courts in the aforementioned cases do not con-
sider the potential to preserve the requirement of a discriminatory 
purpose even in the face of a successful gender-based equal protection 
challenge to the death penalty.254 Texas’s death penalty statute, al-
though facially neutral, is certainly structured and applied in a way that 
discriminates against male defendants.255 In the case of a gender-based 
challenge to Texas’s capital punishment statute, courts should recognize 
this intentional discrimination and find the statute unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.256 
Conclusion 
 With a few rare exceptions, the death penalty effectively applies 
only to men. Women are condemned to death in American society only 
                                                                                                                      
249 See White I, 815 P.2d at 882. 
250 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Richmond, 666 P.2d 57, 66−67 (Ariz. 
1983)); see also Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1184−85 (Ind. 1989) (finding that a 
mere showing that no females were sentenced as habitual offenders under an Indiana 
statute did not constitute an equal protection violation), abrogated by Fajardo v. State, 859 
N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007). 
251 See Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 157. 
252 See id. The court in Banks mentioned in a footnote that “there is a well-documented 
variance between the types of murders generally committed by men and those generally 
committed by women.” Id. at 157, n.60. The court, however, declined to expand on this 
point and did not analyze Tennessee’s gendered understanding of capital crime. See id. at 
157. 
253 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 462−63; supra Part V.B–C. 
254 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322−23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kopec, supra note 16, at 
376−77; supra Part III, V.C. 
255 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 
322−23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kopec, supra note 16, at 376−77; supra Part III, V.C. 
256 See § 19.03; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322−23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kopec, supra 
note 16, at 376−77; supra Part III, V.C. 
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if they blatantly defy feminine stereotypes and thus forfeit the protec-
tion that being a woman otherwise affords. The Texas capital punish-
ment statute, in particular, is constructed in a way that permits and 
even encourages unconstitutional gender discrimination, thereby de-
priving male defendants of their equal rights to life. Given the extreme 
gender disparity in the application of the Texas statute, the Supreme 
Court should distinguish McCleskey v. Kemp and hold that the Texas 
capital punishment statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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